Howdy – it’s Wirb again. Last time I wrote one of these, it was a dissection of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s rubbish propaganda piece against the sphere of Guncad, and a rebuttal to the ignorance and loathing of Australians who seek to push gun control despite homebuilt firearms being instrumental in their nation’s history.
Today, we have a real zinger of an article to chop up. Written by Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, an assistant professor at the Canadian Royal Military College. Per the tagline at the bottom of the article, he “is also the Scientific Director of Pier Point Consulting, a firm specializing in providing analysis and threat assessment related to misuse of emerging technology.” You just know this is going to be a fun piece to look over, especially when the author in question has crossed paths with Guncad on Twitter before.
Now that we’ve established the author, an actual freethinking person instead of cogs within a nameless government-funded multimedia corporation, let’s dive right into it. If you didn’t read the last article analysis, I highly recommend you check that one out first to get a feel of how this’ll go. Only difference is I’ll be adding in more pictures, since Dr. Veilleaux-Lepage (hence to be called “Dr. VP” for convenience’s sake) only added a total of 1 to his article.
Introduction – Get your Peameal Bacon and Timbits Ready
Over the last decade, consumer 3D printing technology has advanced rapidly, driven by the expiration of numerous patents and the growth of a large, global online community of designers, tinkerers, and hobbyists. These developments have significantly influenced the 3D-printed firearm (3DPF) movement. What began as basic single-shot handguns has evolved into extremely sophisticated and reliable firearms. Alongside firearms, 3D-printed accessories such as magazines, suppressors, and optics have also advanced significantly. One particularly concerning trend is the rise of 3D-printed conversion devices (often known as auto-sears or switches)โsmall components that can convert semi-automatic firearms into fully automatic weapons.
Only concerning in places where there’s no such thing as “a rule of law,” but still, a pretty benign opening. This might be a difficult article to break down.
While a significant portion of the 3D-printed firearm community operates lawfully in the United States, where the First and Second Amendments protect many such activities, these developments have not gone unnoticed by insurgents, terrorists, and extremists. Additionally, criminal networks worldwide have turned to 3D-printed firearms as both a lucrative source of income and a means of arming themselves.
Wow. A rare mention of the Burmese rebels fighting the Tatmadaw junta using 3D printed guns. So far as terrorists and extremists go, making their own weapons has been going on pretty much since time immemorial and is no way a new phenomenon. Techniques are just different now, even though converted blank-firing guns still seem to be the cornerstone of crime guns over in that part of the world.
Faced with this phenomenon, lawmakers worldwide have sought to introduce legislation to curb the manufacturing of 3D-printed firearms. In Canada, as of 1 September 2024, individuals must possess a valid firearms license to acquire or import essential firearm parts, including barrels and handgun slides. In New South Wales, Australia and Singapore, it is illegal to possess 3D-printed firearms and related files. In the United States, President Biden signed an executive order to establish an โEmerging Firearms Threats Task Forceโ to address the growing issue of 3D-printed firearms and machine gun conversion devices.
On the Canadian side, slides have been buildable since the earliest Professor Parabellum days, and barrels can be electrochemically machined. So far as Australia goes, I already covered their insanity given NSW is one of the same states it’s illegal to own the Transformers G1 Megatron toy in, as well as the Masterpiece version. Singapore is one of the most authoritarian countries on the face of the planet, so not a good point in favor of laws banning Guncad. As for Biden’s executive order, it meant literally nothing – and he’ll be gone from the White House in less than two months from this article. He doesn’t have any reason to care about the issue, not after his own party couped him and put in a candidate whose public persona was more artificial than a jug of Red #40.
While these initiatives show promise, they are often seen as incomplete measures, focusing solely on individual behaviour rather than addressing the broader role of 3D printing technology in firearm manufacturing. Although other methods of fabricating privately manufactured firearms exist, such as metal folding and bending, casting, and milling, 3D printing has significantly lowered the skill barrier. Therefore, means to address the illicit production of firearms must also centre on the technology at hand. This Insight proposes a multi-faceted approach to combating the proliferation of 3D-printed firearms by exploring potential technological countermeasures. To tackle the issue more effectively, it suggests incorporating elements of Design Against Crime (DAC) directly into the software, hardware, and materials used in 3D printing.
Dr. VP correctly points out that there are other methods of making firearms at home, most of which predate Guncad substantially (and could be found in the many books by the woefully defunct Paladin Press). I would very much disagree that the skill barrier was lowered by 3D printing, given how simple it was for untrained GIs in the Philippines to put together paliuntods. The level of complexity has only gone up, as would be expected in home firearms manufacturing. Dr. VP also fails to point out that there were no successful methods that were introduced to actively impinge on people’s ability to make guns with legacy technology – indeed, Philip A. Luty’s famous submachine gun is still 100% as buildable in the UK now as it was when he was arrested. No laws or other measures were put into place to attempt to – or which could – stop someone from building these guns if they desired to. As for DAC – let’s listen on.
Design Against Crime is both an academic and practical initiative that originated in the UK. It aims to incorporate crime prevention into the design of products, environments, services, and systems. The approach reduces opportunities for crime by embedding crime-prevention features directly into the design process. Developed as collaborative efforts between researchers, designers, and industry, DAC provides a framework for integrating safety measures across various sectors.
Ah yes, the UK. The greatest surveillance state in Western Europe, with an unbridled contempt for its citizenry in all things from taxing cars that don’t meet unreachable emissions requirements to demanding everyone pay a TV license to fund the state-sponsored propaganda network. No need to wait for V for Vendetta to become reality anymore. The country is quite literally ruled by a self-proclaimed socialist right now, after all, just like the book (and yes, movie). Design Against Crime is a laughable initiative that works to handicap prim and proper citizens while functionally handicapping a country’s criminal element in no significant way whatsoever. You might remember DAC as what’s responsible for the UK starting to blunt the tips of kitchen knives out of fear that they can be used to stab someone.
Elements of Design Against Crime that could help raise the barriers to firearm production using 3D printers already exist in current technologies. To conceptualize various Design Against Crime approaches to 3D printing, it is helpful to break down the process of turning Computer-aided design (CAD) files into 3D objects into three distinct levels of interdiction: the slicer software (software level), the 3D printer itself (firmware level), and the filament (material level).
Dr. VP takes an analytic approach himself, which I can appreciate. It should make this substantially easier to break down, not to mention showcase how all three of these interdiction methods would either fail presently, or be easily overcome through the efforts of the Guncad community.
Software Level Interdiction – AKA the Easiest Hoop
Slicer software is a critical tool in 3D printing that converts a 3D model (usually in CAD format) into a set of instructions that the 3D printer can follow. This software โslicesโ the model into horizontal layers and generates G-code, a language that guides the printerโs movements. Different types of slicer software exist, ranging from open-source options like Cura and PrusaSlicer to proprietary versions like Simplify3D and FlashPrint.
Cura all the way, baby. Pretty much everyone in Guncad uses it and finds it to be the best slicer for their projects. Considering most of the recent wave of 3D printables were initially based on a Creality Ender 3 platform, it’s not surprising – Prusas have often been much higher priced than Creality’s line, which made the latter the preferred printer for projects.
Inspiration for software-level interdiction could be drawn from the Counterfeit Deterrence System (CDS), a technology embedded in digital imaging software, such as Photoshop, that prevents the replication of banknotes. The CDS works by recognising specific patterns and then preventing users from opening, editing, or printing the image.
CDS is a brilliant piece of hardware – too bad it’s easy to subvert by, I don’t know, just using digital imaging software that doesn’t have CDS integrated. Easy solutions to seemingly insurmountable problems, though Dr. VP does appear to ignore the fact that a fake bank note would need certain papers and materials that are a far bigger handicap to would-be counterfeiters than photocopying bills.
Similarly, a mechanism could be implemented within commercial slicer software to recognise known 3D-printed firearm models or parts and stop their processing. Commercial slicer software companies would need to be fully on board, implementing these recognition algorithms as part of their productโs core features. While this may work for large, commercially produced slicers, it becomes far more challenging with open-source software. Without specific legislation mandating the inclusion of these security features, integrating similar interdiction measures into open-source slicer software could prove difficult, if not impossible.
Dr. VP is so, so close to getting it here. There will never be a global mandate for inclusion of slicer-associated interdiction functions in open-source software. If there was such a thing, it would be forked and the offending code removed from the source – and everyone would use that fork of the source code along with any improvements therein. Additionally, nothing’s stopping people from just using older versions of Cura or PrusaSlicer should something somehow be introduced against all odds. Again, this is an extremely easy solution to overcome a hurdle so small that even my grandmother could jump.
A potential interim solution might be to enable slicers to block the processing of 3DPF parts and accessories voluntarilyโeither as an add-on software or an admin-level option within the software itself. This approach would be particularly useful for institutions like schools, libraries, universities, and creative building spaces, allowing them to safeguard their equipment against misuse and unauthorized activities.
The spaces you mention already have safeguards against misuse. They’re called “community managers.” At every single makerspace, there is someone there at some point in time that is shorter than however long it would take to 3D print a frame or receiver on lab-grade 3D printers. If I walked into my local makerspace and started 3D printing a gun, that print wouldn’t last 30 minutes on the bed before someone would shut the printer off and ask me to leave. This is a theoretical safeguard that’s completely unnecessary in the environs he suggests it for, which, quite frankly, feels like an attempt to pass the buck in such spaces. It certainly doesn’t stop someone from making a gun at home.
Firmware Level Interdiction – AKA Back to RepRap
In the late twentieth century, advances in computer and photocopy technology made it possible for individuals without specialized training to replicate currency. In response, document output devices such as traditional photocopiers and 2D printers began incorporating various anti-counterfeiting features at the firmware level. Firmware refers to the built-in software embedded within a deviceโs hardware that controls its fundamental operations. Unlike regular software, which users can modify or replace, firmware is deeply integrated into the device, making these security features difficult to bypass or tamper with.
You might remember the features Dr. VP is talking about most notably for the fact that they make HP printers miserable to use. You know exactly what I mean – the firmware’s responsible for HP printers refusing to work with non-HP ink cartridges, or refusing to work with refilled ink cartridges, all in a desperate bid to bilk the consumer out of their money through expensive and proprietary ink cartridges that cost a hundred times what they actually cost to make. In short, they make people’s lives miserable.
Firmware measures to counter the misuse of emerging technology have been implemented in the UAV sphere, with mixed results. Several producers of commercial drones have integrated built-in software restrictions, such as geofencing for GPS-enabled drones. Geofencing uses GPS data to create virtual boundaries that prevent drones from entering restricted or sensitive areas, like airports or government buildings.
And people have gotten around this through using either custom firmware packages that aren’t GPS-integrated or using legacy firmware that doesn’t have the software features in question. Some DJI drones are a perfect example of that, as well as their bootlegs.
One such measure that could inspire efforts to counter the proliferation of 3DPF, similar to the CDS, is the use of OMRON Ringsโa pattern of small yellow, green, or orange circles arranged in a specific configuration and subtly embedded into the design of banknotes. When attempting to photocopy or scan a banknote containing OMRON Rings, most modern photocopiers, scanners, and printers detect this pattern at the firmware level, automatically stopping or distorting the copying process to prevent unauthorized reproduction. While incorporating similar elements within 3D printing files to facilitate detection is unlikely to be effective, firmware could be designed to recognise and halt the production of specific patterns or shapes associated with known privately manufactured firearm designs.
Key word of course being “most.” All people who want to do something need to do is find something that doesn’t. I’m admittedly unsure why Dr. VP decided to proceed down this line of thought when he admits detecting “similar elements within 3D printing files to facilitate detection is unlikely to be effective.” As for the latter firmware, this is unlikely to work even if the community didn’t find a way to flash 3D printers with custom firmware that allowed them to print guns.
One significant challenge in detecting and recognising 3D-printed firearms is the sheer volume and variety of designs. A recent study uncovered more than 2,100 different 3D-printed firearm plans between 2021 and 2023 alone. In addition, the constant influx of new files and plans makes it difficult for interdiction measures to keep pace. Many of these designs are โremixesโ or modifications of existing models, incorporating slight changes to their structure or components. These subtle variations can easily evade detection algorithms that rely solely on a database inventory of known firearm patterns.
Dr. VP practically admits defeat on this item by admitting that database-based recognition systems would be easily overwhelmed by new designs. This of course would also require the given database to be updated through the internet, a problem easily corrected by just not connecting the printer to wifi, or flashing custom firmware. He does, however, propose an alternative.
A potential way to overcome this difficulty is for software or firmware-level interdiction to use machine learning. Instead of depending on a static database of designs, machine learning algorithms could be trained to identify potential firearm parts based on common features and patterns. This dynamic approach would allow interdiction measures to adapt to new or modified designs in real-time, enhancing their ability to recognise firearms regardless of subtle structural changes or remixes.
Machine learning has been a disaster. Aside from being so inaccurate that it got lawyers who consulted it into trouble, systems like ChatGPT are very easily well-poisoned by direct targeted attacks on the influx of data they take in. This is similar, in a sense, to the old tactic of Google bombing, where the algorithm of a system, crude or complex, is bombarded excessively and repeatedly with false information to the point that it accepts the information as truth. In probably the most famous case, former U.S. President George W. Bush was Google bombed, along with director and cinema hack Michael Moore, to be the first things people saw when they googled “miserable failure.” The same technique would be used with the algorithmic models of such firmware, should it not be flashed out of existence, to sabotage the system and render it non-functional, either through detecting everything as a gun or guns as nothing out of the ordinary.
In addition to offering a promising approach to limiting the production of 3D-printed firearms, firmware-level interdiction can also tackle the challenging task of tracing the origins of a 3DPF. This task is made more difficult by the lack of traditional markings and serial numbers typically required on commercially manufactured firearms.
That presumes tracking systems in question can be identified down to the printer, which is unlikely. So far as to why homebuilt guns lack markings and serial numbers, well… You already put enough work into making the thing for you and you alone. Why would you put anything else on it?
In recent years, several new strategies have been developed to trace a particular firearm back to a specific 3D printer. These methods involve matching unique patterns created by the printerโs hot-end nozzle or fine marks left on the printer bed to those found on a 3DPF, helping to link the firearm to its source. Additionally, existing Design Against Crime features incorporated into traditional 2D printers could aid in identifying a 3DPFโs origin.
So… matching nozzle patterns or bed marks? this would just mean that nozzles would need to be either modified or replaced frequently, the same for beds, which are easy enough to polish and/or replace. These proposed features are easily overcome with the barest amount of effort by a dedicated printer and serve no use insofar as general 3D printing goes. At worst, you’ve created a market for people who offer aftermarket nozzles and beds, which cannot realistically be legislated away, that do not have these tracing features. Considering how much simpler those parts would be than what is effectively an attempt to micro-stamp 3D printers, people could make a fortune.
Although their existence only became public in 2004, many traditional 2D printers had already been embedding Machine Identification Codes for years. These codes are composed of tiny, nearly invisible yellow dots printed on every page. They encode crucial information, such as the printerโs serial number, model, and the date and time of printing, allowing law enforcement agencies to trace the source of printed documents as a measure against counterfeiting and other illegal activities. This technology is believed to have been instrumental in identifying Reality Winner, a former intelligence contractor who leaked classified information to the media, leading to her arrest and conviction.
In short, your printer is spying on you. The technique of printers effectively being able to rat out anything a person does contradictory to the local laws, whether moral or not, is easily exploited by authoritarian regimes seeking to track down dissidents producing printed propaganda. You would need to have some way of defiling or otherwise defacing the printer’s dots to maintain anonymity in such a nation. Fortunately, there’s already an app for that.
A similar approach could be employed for 3D printers by incorporating a tracking system that embeds unique identifiers, such as microscopic markings or codes, into the surface of every 3D-printed object. These markings could contain information about the printerโs serial number, model, and the date and time of printing. Integrated directly into the printerโs firmware, this system would automatically and discreetly apply these identifiers during the printing process, making it nearly impossible for users to alter or remove them. Such a method would provide law enforcement with a powerful tool to trace a 3D-printed firearm back to the specific printer used, facilitating investigations and potentially deterring illegal manufacturing by ensuring traceability.
And a similar approach would be employed by printers to either flash the firmware to not use the system, or to run the printer through an app developed to force it to obfuscate the pattern, and thus prevent identification. I wouldn’t call this particular steganographic approach a “powerful tool” if it can be so easily interfered with. And that’s not including the fact that it would be possible to acetone the outside of the print, ostensibly to smooth layer lines, which would deform any micro-texturing imprinted by the printer on the gun in question. Would make it look nicer too. Anyways, that’s two down. What does Dr. VP have next?
Material Level Interdiction – AKA Making Printing Eco-Friendly
Recent research has shown promise in using chemical analysis to link polymer traces found after the discharge of a 3DPF to specific types, brands, and colours of commercial filaments. However, efforts to trace a 3DPF to its point of origin could be further enhanced if filament manufacturers adopt Design Against Crime practices, similar to the use of identification (post-detonation) chemical taggants in industrial explosives.
Dr. VP is referring primarily to the tagging of Semtex, a high explosive which until the turn of the millennium was effectively undetectable chemically before a small sample of 2,3-dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane (DMDNB) was added as a means of tracing where the material had come from. This of course ignoring the fact that author Seymour Lecker taught the world how to make Semtex from scratch the same year Explosia claimed it began adding taggant, though Libya preferred to import rather than make its own Semtex.
Chemical taggants are unique markers or additives mixed into a material to enable identification and traceability. In the context of industrial explosives, taggants have been introduced to facilitate the identification of the manufacturer and batch number following a detonation. For instance, since the 1980s, all explosives manufactured in Switzerland are required to contain taggants.
Well, I don’t think there are any such laws here in the US, not to mention there’s no taggants for either ANFO or ammonal given how widespread their ingredients are. I might as well point out acetone peroxide too, if only because I hope some stupid terrorist who wants to do something malevolent tries to use it and only blows himself and his co-conspirators to kingdom come. Again, easily subverted, and criminals still have easy access to a whole cacophony of easily made improvised explosive mixtures.
In the 3D printing sphere, taggants have been discussed as a way to counter counterfeits by embedding unique chemical markers or identifiers directly into the printing filament during the manufacturing process. This means that the printed object can later be analysed to identify the filamentโs specific batch, manufacturer, and other details. In other words, these taggants act like a โfingerprintโ for each filament batch, allowing the material used in a printed object to be traced back to its source. This helps authenticate the origin of a printed item, making it easier to distinguish genuine products from counterfeits.
Aside from the fact that adding chemicals to a 3D printed filament may alter its durability or properties in a number of negative ways, there’s a two word solution to get around this: filament recycling. Filament recycling has already been pushed as a means to reduce the inevitability of plastic waste, and recycled filament is already sold by multiple reputable manufacturers in the 3D printing world. Most notably, however, filament recycling is also getting more and more consumer-accessible, and in theory, it can use almost any printable polymer feedstock. It would be possible for someone to shred remnants of several different suppliers’ PLA or ABS and mix them together, or to use plastic pellets converted into filament which doesn’t have any chemical tag to them. In short, the last of the three hurdles is already overcome – and a market would quickly develop for filament without taggant, thus starting a whole new industry.
The inclusion of taggants in commercial 3D printing filament could also assist in criminal investigations. If a 3D-printed firearm is recovered, the embedded taggants in the polymer could identify the specific filament used, thereby providing a lead to the printerโs owner or the source of the material. Additionally, it would allow investigators to chemically match firearms made using the same filament or filament purchased in batches.
I think we already established how this would be overcome by malevolent or even mischievous actors in the Guncad community, so not much more to be said. Let’s move on to the part where myself and Dr. VP can perhaps find more common ground.
Constraints – AKA This Won’t Work
None of the aforementioned technological solutions represent a panacea. Each faces significant constraints that limit its effectiveness and implementation.
Frankly they represent more plague than panacea, to conventional consumers as well as to the 3D2A crowd. Ignorant of constraints, all the solutions in question have had explicitly described methods of overcoming their limitations clearly defined so far. None of these are actually beneficial in any way that justifies their incorporation, especially considering their ease of defeat.
Incorporating these interdiction features would require manufacturers to comply voluntarily or through regulation. However, there are several reasons why the industry might resist voluntary compliance. First, such measures could increase production costs and complexity, which many manufacturers, especially smaller companies, may be unwilling to bear, particularly if they fear it could make their products less competitive in the market. Additionally, some manufacturers might view these features as an infringement on consumer rights or privacy, especially within communities that advocate for the open-source nature of 3D printing and resist any form of control over their equipment. In fact, some manufacturers have formed strong ties with the 3DPF community; for example, Polymaker, a filament producer, has entered into sponsorship arrangements with influencers within the 3DPF community and are, therefore, unlikely to voluntarily adopt such measures.
And Polymaker is absolutely worth getting your business for that. So far as cost and complexity goes, there is no way you can justify to a manufacturer, “Hey, you should adopt these easily subverted features and burden yourself with useless additions to your machines and filament.” Forget being “unwilling” to bear, companies would ignore this out-of-pocket. Dr. VP does also correctly point out that this raises potential infringements on the independence and privacy of consumers, which certainly wouldn’t fly in the United States of America.
From a regulatory standpoint, the implementation of such features poses several challenges. Creating and enforcing regulations would require significant global coordination, as 3D printing technology and filament production are not confined to any single country. Different nations have varying legal frameworks for firearms and privacy rights, making it nearly impossible to create standardized regulations that all manufacturers must follow. This not only complicates enforcement but also risks creating a fragmented market where some manufacturers comply with regulations while others do not, potentially undermining the effectiveness of global efforts.
The UN is the single biggest piece of proof that global efforts don’t work. Creating a global coordinative effort to try and stifle the ability of 3D printed guns would directly impinge on the freedoms guaranteed to people around the world, particularly in America where code, including the code gun CAD files are made of, is considered free speech. Manufacturers will target the most permissible market, and if larger manufacturers did pull out due to global regulation somehow being successful against all odds, other manufacturers would step in and build their own share of the market, even through grey means if need be.
The 3DPF community has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to quickly adapt to regulatory measures and crackdowns, implementing new procedures and processes both in the design of firearms and in manufacturing methods.
This is basically the summation of the article right here. After all the methods described, all the countermeasures suggested as deployment against the spread of Guncad, this sentence effectively admits defeat. Guncad can and will, on a global scale, get around whatever handicap ends up getting put in their way. Whether it’s making a repeating firearm from scratch, making barrels from scratch, making ammunition from scratch, or dealing with attempts by legalese to suppress files and even communication platforms used to develop ideas, Guncad always comes out triumphant. Not surprising that people with an unabashed passion for liberty would take up such a burden.
Despite these constraints, implementing these technological solutions would nonetheless significantly raise the barriers for the production of privately manufactured firearms. The proliferation of 3D printing has drastically lowered these barriers, allowing more widespread access to firearm manufacturing. By incorporating these security features, whether at the software, firmware, or material level, it is possible to partially restore the difficulty of creating PMFs, thereby helping to mitigate the risks associated with their unregulated productionโideally without stifling lawful innovation.
Not significantly at all, as mentioned previously. Every “solution” offered is either currently or theoretically currently able to be worked around by someone who wants to with little effort. The proliferation of 3D printing, and Guncad as a result, has led to remarkable technological advances that intelligence agencies should be taking advantage of, and which freedom fighters such as those in Burma have used to great success against oppressive regimes. Any temporary partial restoration of difficulty would be overcome by the law-abiders and adopted by the maladaptive within a year at absolute maximum. Why not encourage countries to actually work hand in hand with Guncad and enjoy their innovation instead of demonizing them? Maybe they’d get the next Evelyn Owen, George Kellgren, or God forbid, John Browning or Samuel Colt.
Before I wrap this article up, there’s one final thing I’d like to address from Dr. VP’s article – which, for what it’s worth, was flawed, but not utter propaganda like the ABC article was. Dr. VP suggests “lawful innovation” insofar as Guncad is an acceptable, or at least tolerable, reason to justify its existence in some form or fashion. I would respectfully ask, how is the average person supposed to do this? In his current country of residence and profession, it’s illegal to make your own firearms without a license that is functionally impossible for most citizens to get without bribes or government connections. In the UK, which he sourced as the idea for DAC, it’s illegal to possess a firearm under almost every circumstance, let alone make it from scratch – again, something impossible for the average citizen to do legally.
I’ll go ahead and conclude everything with a question for Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage himself: What justifies “lawful innovation” when it comes to 3D printed firearms? As mentioned before, if you made a 3D printed firearm without having the connections to get a manufacturing license in your country of residence, you’d be jailed. Same for the country you’ve take the idea of DAC technology from. So, do you have a framework by which Guncad innovators, or people who want to be innovators like IvanTheTroll, JStark, FMDA, Derwood, etc, can legally pursue innovation of 3D printed guns in the countries you either live in or are drawing inspiration from? I would seriously like to know, since right now there’s a lot of “what shouldn’t be allowed” and not a lot of “what should be allowed” regarding this subject. Figuring out means by which 3D printing firearms could be promoted or otherwise allowed within the various countries whose representatives you’ve spoken with could also change the tone of Guncad towards your articles and posts on the subject.
